A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation
Object category:
Elektronische Ressource
Person/Institution:
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Place of publication:
Oxford
Date:
2007
Extent, illustration, format:
1 Online-Ressource (336 p.)
Language:
Englisch
Providing institution:
Additional information
Abstract:
The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. This book looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? The book brings together developments in both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. It concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods
Object text:
English
Access and usage options
Contact
Universität Erfurt
Forschungsbibliothek Gotha
Schloss Friedenstein
Schlossplatz 1
99867 Gotha
+49 361 737-5540
bibliothek.gotha(at)uni-erfurt.de
Forschungsbibliothek Gotha
Schloss Friedenstein
Schlossplatz 1
99867 Gotha
+49 361 737-5540
bibliothek.gotha(at)uni-erfurt.de
Administrative details
Created:
2023-04-13
Last changed:
2022-04-26
Added to portal:
2023-04-13
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